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Abstract— With improvement in smart grids through two-way 
communication, demand response (DR) has gained significant 
attention due to the inherent flexibility provided by shifting non-
critical loads from peak periods to off-peak periods, which can 
greatly improve grid reliability and reduce cost of energy. 
Operators utilize DR to enhance operational flexibility and 
alleviate network congestion. However, the intelligent two-way 
communication is susceptible to cyber-attacks. This paper studies 
the benefits of DR in security-constrained economic dispatch 
(SCED) and then the vulnerability of the system to line overloads 
when cyber-attack targets DR signals. This paper proposes a false 
demand response signal and load measurement injection (FSMI) 
cyber-attack model that sends erroneous DR signals while hacking 
measurements to make the attack undetectable. Simulation results 
on the IEEE 24-bus system (i) demonstrate the cost-saving benefits 
of demand response, and (ii) show significant line overloads when 
the demand response signals are altered under an FSMI attack. 
 
Index Terms— Controllable load curtailment, Cyber-attack, 
Demand response, Demand response signal redistribution, False 
data injection, False load measurement injection, Linear 
programming, Optimization, Security-constrained economic 
dispatch. 
NOMENCLATURE 
Sets: 
𝐺𝐺 Set of online generators. 
𝐺𝐺(𝑛𝑛) Set of online generators connected to bus n. 
𝐾𝐾 Set of lines. 
𝐾𝐾+(𝑛𝑛) Set of lines with bus n as receiving bus. 
𝐾𝐾−(𝑛𝑛) Set of lines with bus n as sending bus. 
𝑇𝑇 Set of time periods. 
𝑁𝑁 Set of buses. 
  
Indices: 
𝑔𝑔 Generator g.  
𝑘𝑘 Line k. 
𝑡𝑡 Time t. 
n bus n. 
l Targeted attack line for line over-load 
  
Parameters: 
𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔 Linear operation cost for generator g. 
𝑐𝑐𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷
15  Cost for shifted demand response by 1 period. 
𝑐𝑐𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷
30  Cost for shifted demand response by 2 periods. 
𝑐𝑐𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷
45  Cost for shifted demand response by 3 periods. 
𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 Minimum output limit of generator g. 
𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 Maximum output limit of generator g. 
𝑃𝑃𝑘𝑘
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 Long-term thermal line limit for line k. 
𝑏𝑏𝑘𝑘 Susceptance of line k. 
𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 Forecasted demand at bus n in time period t. 
𝛼𝛼 Load shift deviation factor. 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚
𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 Maximum DR participation at bus n. 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷� 𝑚𝑚
𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚      Maximum post-attack DR under at bus n. 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷� 𝑚𝑚
𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 Minimum post-attack DR under at bus n. 
𝑆𝑆0 Limit of cumulative phase angle deviation 𝑙𝑙1-
norm constraint. 
𝑄𝑄0 Limit of total DR deviation 𝑙𝑙1-norm constraint. 
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 Net-demand served at time t at node n. 
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚  Maximum net-demand served at node n. 
𝛥𝛥𝑇𝑇 Short-term 15-minute period/time window.  
  
Variables: 
𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔,𝑡𝑡 Output of generator g in time period t. 
𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚,1 Deviation in phase angle of bus n. 
𝑞𝑞𝑚𝑚 Deviation in shifted demand at bus n. 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡15  Demand shifted by 1 period at bus n in time period t. 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡30  Demand shifted by 2 periods at bus n in time period t. 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡45  Demand shifted by 3 periods at bus n in time period t. 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚,1 Total scheduled demand shifted at bus n in period 1. 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷� 𝑚𝑚,1 False demand scheduled to be shifted at bus n in period 1. 
∆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷� 𝑚𝑚,1 DR deviation at bus n in time period 1.   
𝑃𝑃𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡 Flow on line k in time period t. 
𝑃𝑃�𝑘𝑘,1 Attacked flow on line k in first time period. 
𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 Phase angle of bus n in time period t. 
𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 Phase angle of bus m in time period t. 
𝜃𝜃�𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 Post- attack phase angle of bus n in period t. 
𝜃𝜃�𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 Post- attack phase angle of bus m in period t. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
he advancement in smart grid technologies has brought 
two-way communications along with sensing and control 
signals. This requires an intelligent energy management 
system (EMS) and an enhanced cyber-layer to efficiently and 
securely operate. These technologies enable system operators 
to determine and send signals to redispatch generators and 
enable demand response for controllable loads. However, this 
increases the vulnerability of the system to cyber-attacks. The 
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key components of EMS include supervisory control and data 
acquisition (SCADA), state estimation with bad-data detection, 
real-time contingency analysis (RTCA) and security-
constrained economic dispatch (SCED) [1], as shown in Fig. 1 
(a). 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Fig. 1. Illustration of power grid real-time operations (a) under normal 
operation (b) under the proposed FSMI attack. 
Here, SCADA consolidates all the measurements, and then 
the state estimation along with the bad data detection can work 
iteratively to estimate the true system state variables. The 
RTCA process is a sequence of power flow runs using the state 
estimation solution to identify critical contingencies in the 
system. The SCED determines the physical signals for least-
cost generator dispatch solution to meet the forecasted demand, 
the information from RTCA is used in SCED to ensure 
reliability and security of the system [2]. 
The SCED is not only used to determine the least-cost 
generator dispatch solution but also obtain demand response 
(DR) signals. This problem is solved in real-time and short-term 
operations in both regulated and deregulated environments. DR 
through controllable loads benefits the system by moving non-
critical deferrable loads from peak hours to non-peak hours 
which increases the system flexibility [3]. Therefore, the 
operators require DR participating loads to be dispatchable in 
the SCED. The loads participating in DR programs are 
compensated through capacity markets and/or real-time 
markets [4]-[9].  
Before the automated DR was implemented, load 
controllability was implemented through manual intervention 
which had lower chances of cyber-attacks. However, with the 
increasing use of standard products, operating systems and 
distributed networking devices add intelligence and two-way 
communication capabilities to the smart grid [10], which results 
in automated demand response. This eventually means another 
access for cyber vulnerability attacks to the system.  
There is an extensive interest in the vulnerability of power 
systems and cyber-attacks on various elements of the system 
such as attacks on system state estimation [11], system topology 
[12], generator dynamics [13], and energy markets [14]. A 
popular cyber-attack targets overloading the system, i.e. 
overloading one or multiple lines, which may cause large 
system disturbances and lead to cascade events [15]-[16]. In 
Fig. 1 (b), it is perceived that sending erroneous DR signals 
along with coordinated false measurements can be undetectable 
to the system operator.  
In markets that offer DR services, consumers have the option 
to register for DR programs that are run by utilities. The utility 
offers incentives to consumers to either lower or shift their 
electric demand to improve power system balancing and reduce 
the overall system cost. Utilities use a client device referred to 
as a DR client to communicate with the utility DR server [17].  
Such technologies resulted in an increase in DR programs 
participation in energy markets to 29,674 MW in 2018, 7.7% 
higher than 2017 [18]. When the loads are required to shift, the 
DR server will send commands to the DR clients, then the DR 
clients either defer or drop the loads following the DR signal 
from the server.  
Such timely communication requires the availability of the 
communication channels and server systems especially for fast-
DR to control the electricity demand within a very short period. 
Not only that, the integrity of data requires the curtailment 
signal should only be sent by operator and only participating 
customers receive DR signals. The availability of the 
communication network and the integrity of DR data are 
essential for information security. Without these standard 
information securities, signals can be maliciously manipulated 
to pose significant impact to the system. Therefore, with such 
vulnerabilities, the automated DR system that brings great 
performance benefit to the grid can also pose great risks and 
challenges in protecting the smart grids from cyber security 
threats [19]. [20] investigated an automated DR process and 
proposed a security-enhancement mechanism to enhance the 
signal verification. A novel dynamic load altering attack that 
changes a group of unsecured loads is proposed in [21], which 
can cause physical damage to grid. A real-time anomaly 
detection algorithm that utilizes load forecasts, generation 
schedules and synchrophasor data can detect false data injection 
attack [22]. The vulnerabilities of standard load forecasting 
algorithms are examined in [23]. Though [21]–[23] investigated 
power grid cyber-security, vulnerability associated with DR 
signals has not been considered. Also, [20] solely focused on 
load altering attack which damages the grid by destabilizing the 
frequency away from its nominal range. But the studies on the 
impact of malicious cyber-attack targeted on transmission line 
power flow against DR signals were never conducted. 
To bridge the gap presented above, this paper first studies the 
benefits of incorporating DR in SCED. The DR considered in 
this work incentivizes participating customers to shift demand 
from peak to non-peak hours. Following this, a false demand 
response signal and load measurement injection (FSMI) cyber-
attack model is proposed in this paper which affects the EMS 
operation as shown in Fig. 1 (b). The proposed FSMI attack 
aims to lead to physical line overloads by manipulating DR 
signals and load measurements, which illustrates the cyber-
vulnerability of demand response that is being widely adopted 
in real-time secure operations. The rest of this paper is 
organized as follows. Section II depicts the SCED and SCED-
  
 
DR formulation and Section III describes the proposed FSMI 
attack model. The test system with various load profiles is 
described in Section IV. Section V presents the simulation 
results and discusses the benefits and cyber-vulnerability of 
demand response in real-time operations of electric power 
systems. Finally, Section VI draws the conclusions.  
II.  SCED AND SCED-DR FORMULATION  
The goal of SCED/SCED-DR is the least-cost dispatch of 
committed generators for a short-term forecasted demand; in 
this work the look-ahead horizon is 1 hour with 15-minute 
moving intervals. SCED/SCED-DR models are based on the 
simplified DC power flow model and they are subject to 
security constraints of the generators and transmission 
networks. The SCED/SCED-DR considered in this paper is 
based on a moving window method; in other words, it looks 
ahead multiple intervals while only the solution associated with 
the first interval would be implemented. 
The objective function for SCED-DR minimizes the cost of 
operations along with the penalties associated with shifting 
non-critical demand as a DR action for 15-minute, 30-minute 
and 45-minute, as shown in (1). In the case of SCED, the 
penalty cost associated with demand shifting is disregarded as 
DR is not implemented.  
 Min: ∑ �𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔,𝑡𝑡� + ∑ � 𝑐𝑐𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷15 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡15 +𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡𝑔𝑔,𝑡𝑡 𝑐𝑐𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷30𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡30 +  𝑐𝑐𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷45𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡45 � (1) 
Equation (2) shows that the generator outputs are restricted 
by their minimum and maximum limits. The network 
constraints are represented in (3)-(6). Here, (3) denotes the 
reference bus of the system. The line flows are calculated using 
the simplified DC power flow model in (4). The thermal limits 
of the lines are imposed in (5). Finally, constraint (6) ensures 
supply and demand are balanced for each node. 
 𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ≤ 𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔,𝑡𝑡 ≤  𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ,∀𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝐺𝐺, 𝑡𝑡𝑔𝑔𝑇𝑇 (2) 
 𝜃𝜃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡 = 0,∀𝑡𝑡𝑔𝑔𝑇𝑇 (3) 
 𝑃𝑃𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑏𝑏𝑘𝑘�𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 − 𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡� = 0,∀𝑘𝑘𝑔𝑔𝐾𝐾, 𝑡𝑡𝑔𝑔𝑇𝑇 (4) 
 −𝑃𝑃𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ≤  𝑃𝑃𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡 ≤ 𝑃𝑃𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ,∀𝑘𝑘𝑔𝑔𝐾𝐾, 𝑡𝑡𝑔𝑔𝑇𝑇 (5) 
 ∑ 𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔,𝑡𝑡𝑔𝑔∈𝐺𝐺(𝑚𝑚) + ∑ 𝑃𝑃𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘∈𝐾𝐾+(𝑚𝑚) −∑ 𝑃𝑃𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘∈𝐾𝐾−(𝑚𝑚) =
𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 ,∀𝑛𝑛𝑔𝑔𝑁𝑁, 𝑡𝑡𝑔𝑔𝑇𝑇  (6) 
In the case of SCED-DR, (6) is replaced with (7)-(8). The DR 
actions imply that non-critical demand can be shifted by one, 
two or three periods. As shown in (7), the amount of deferrable 
demand should not exceed the DR participation 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 at each 
node, which is set to 30% of the nodal load in this work. The 
updated nodal power balance constraint (8) considers the load 
deferred from previous intervals to current intervals  
 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡15 + 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡30 + 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡45 ≤ 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ,∀𝑛𝑛𝑔𝑔𝑁𝑁, 𝑡𝑡𝑔𝑔𝑇𝑇 (7) 
 ∑ 𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔,𝑡𝑡𝑔𝑔∈𝐺𝐺(𝑚𝑚) + ∑ 𝑃𝑃𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘∈𝐾𝐾+(𝑚𝑚) −∑ 𝑃𝑃𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘∈𝐾𝐾−(𝑚𝑚) =
𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 −  𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡15 − 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡30 − 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡45 + 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡−115 +
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡−230 + 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡−345 ,∀𝑛𝑛𝑔𝑔𝑁𝑁, 𝑡𝑡𝑔𝑔𝑇𝑇  (8) 
In summary, the regular SCED is modelled through (1)-(6) 
while the SCED-DR is modelled through (1)-(5) and (7)-(8).  
III.  FSMI ATTACK MODELS      
     DR typically requires timely communication to control the 
electricity demand within a very short response time. In the 
proposed FSMI model, it is assumed that the attacker has the 
knowledge of the system topology and parameters and has 
access to all load measurements. It is also assumed that the 
attacker has control of the real-time communication channels to 
intercept and modify the DR signals sent by operator as shown 
in Fig. 1 (b). 
   The solution only to the first interval of SCED-DR is 
implemented per Section II; and the proposed FSMI model 
targets at the first interval or current operating interval. The 
generation dispatch, 𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔,1, and nodal phase angle, 𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚,1, obtained 
from SCED-DR are represented as 𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔,1∗  and 𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚,1∗ , respectively; 
they are fixed parameters in the proposed FSMI attack model. 
The false DR signals, 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷� 𝑚𝑚,1, are modeled to overload a target 
line. Note that shortly after the proposed attack and when users 
follow the false DR signals, some false load measurements are 
required to cover such an FSMI attack. The proposed FSMI 
attack model can be formulated as an optimization problem 
which focuses on the first period of the SCED-DR model 
described in Section II. Its objective function (9) is to maximize 
the physical line flow of a chosen target line l in the attack 
region for the first SCED interval. 
 Max: 𝑠𝑠𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛(𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠,1) ∙ 𝑃𝑃�𝑠𝑠,1   (9) 
 
 𝑃𝑃�𝑘𝑘,1 − 𝑏𝑏𝑘𝑘�𝜃𝜃�𝑚𝑚,1 − 𝜃𝜃�𝑚𝑚,1� = 0,∀𝑘𝑘𝑔𝑔𝐾𝐾 
∑ 𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔,1∗𝑔𝑔∈𝐺𝐺(𝑚𝑚) + ∑ 𝑃𝑃�𝑘𝑘,1𝑘𝑘∈𝐾𝐾+(𝑚𝑚) −∑ 𝑃𝑃�𝑘𝑘,1𝑘𝑘∈𝐾𝐾−(𝑚𝑚) =
𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚,1 − 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷� 𝑚𝑚,1,∀𝑛𝑛𝑔𝑔𝑁𝑁  (10) (11)  
 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚,1 − 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚,115∗ − 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚,130∗ − 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚,145∗ = 0,∀𝑛𝑛𝑔𝑔𝑁𝑁 (12) 
 𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚,1 = 𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚,1∗ − 𝜃𝜃�𝑚𝑚,1,∀𝑛𝑛𝑔𝑔𝑁𝑁 (13) 
 ∆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷� 𝑚𝑚,1 = 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚,1 − 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷� 𝑚𝑚,1,∀𝑛𝑛𝑔𝑔𝑁𝑁 (14) 
 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷�𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = (1 + 𝛼𝛼) ∙ 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚,1,∀𝑛𝑛𝑔𝑔𝑁𝑁 (15) 
 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷�𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = (1 − 𝛼𝛼) ∙ 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚,1,∀𝑛𝑛𝑔𝑔𝑁𝑁 (16) 
 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷�𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ≤ 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷� 𝑚𝑚,1 ≤ 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷�𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ,∀𝑛𝑛𝑔𝑔𝑁𝑁 (17) 
 ∑ �𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚,1�𝑚𝑚∈𝑁𝑁 ≤ 𝑆𝑆0 ,∀𝑛𝑛𝑔𝑔𝑁𝑁  (18) 
 ∑ �∆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷� 𝑚𝑚,1�𝑚𝑚∈𝑁𝑁 ≤ 𝑄𝑄0, ∀𝑛𝑛𝑔𝑔𝑁𝑁  (19) 
The cyber attacked line power flows are obtained through 
(10) using the DC model and the cyber nodal power balance is 
enforced using (11). The total load that is expected to be shifted 
by SCED-DR without FSMI attack is calculated in (12). Here, 
the amount of demand deferred from the first period to the 
subsequent 3 periods, 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚,115∗, 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚,130∗ and 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚,145∗, are the fixed 
values obtained from SCED-DR. The relationship between 
physical bus angles and cyber bus angles is shown in (13). 
Equation (14) defines the demand response deviation, ∆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷� 𝑚𝑚,1, 
as the difference between scheduled demand response and 
attacked demand response. Constraints (15)-(17) limits the 
attack region to avoid large DR signal changes that can 
intimidate the operators with practical considerations: (i) the 
attacker can only alter DR signals for loads that are supposed to 
receive the actual DR signals, and (ii) DR signal deviation is 
limited to a tolerance set by the attacker. The summations of the 
absolute change in state variables and DR deviations are 
restricted by (18) and (19) respectively. The l1-norm constraints 
(18) and (19) can be converted into equivalent linear constraints 
[15] which are represented in (20)-(25). 
𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚 ≤ 𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚  ,∀𝑛𝑛𝑔𝑔𝑁𝑁  (20) 
−𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚 ≤ 𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚 ,∀𝑛𝑛𝑔𝑔𝑁𝑁  (21) 
  
 
∑ 𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ≤ 𝑆𝑆0 ,∀𝑛𝑛𝑔𝑔𝑁𝑁  (22) 
∆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷� 𝑚𝑚,1 ≤ 𝑞𝑞𝑚𝑚 ,∀𝑛𝑛𝑔𝑔𝑁𝑁  (23) 
−∆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷� 𝑚𝑚,1 ≤ 𝑞𝑞𝑚𝑚 ,∀𝑛𝑛𝑔𝑔𝑁𝑁  (24) 
∑ 𝑞𝑞𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ≤ 𝑄𝑄0 ,∀𝑛𝑛𝑔𝑔𝑁𝑁  (25) 
A limited-channel FSMI attack model can then be formed 
using (9)-(19) and (20)-(25). However, the attacker can 
magnify the severity of the attack by sending erroneous signals 
to controllable loads that did not receive any DR signal from 
the operator in the pre-attack state. This type of attack is known 
as an unlimited-channel FSMI attack model which is 
represented by (9)-(16) and (20)-(26). Here, (26) relaxes the 
constraints on the number of attacked DR channels and the 
amount of nodal DR deviation that are restricted in (17). 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷� 𝑚𝑚,1 ≤ 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ,∀𝑛𝑛𝑔𝑔𝑁𝑁 (26) 
IV.  TEST CASE: IEEE 24-BUS SYSTEM WITH RES 
To study the effect of DR, the IEEE 24-bus system [24], is 
utilized. The base system contains 24 buses, 33 generators and 
38 lines. The total generation capacity from generators is 3,393 
MW and the system peak load is 2,281 MW.  
 
Fig. 2. IEEE 24-bus system with on-line and off-line generators [25]. 
Based on unit-commitment for the forecasted demand, only 
21 generators are online. In Fig.2, online generators that have a 
combined capacity of 2,792 MW are shown in green and off-
line generators are shown in red. Line 10 and line 23 are 
highlighted in orange as they are the bottle neck lines in the 
system. Fig. 3 shows the multiple one-hour system demand 
profiles with four 15-minute intervals. Three different scenarios 
are considered to identify the impact of DR: low, medium and 
high varying demand scenarios. 
 
Fig. 3. System demand in various intervals. 
V.  RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
The mathematical model was implemented using AMPL and 
solved using Gurobi with a MIPGAP of 0.001. The computer 
with Intel® Xeon(R) W-2195 CPU @ 2.30GHz, and 128 GB of 
RAM was utilized.  
A.  Benefits of DR: 
From Fig. 4, SCED-DR provides a lower cost solution 
compared to SCED for medium and high varying demand. At 
high demand variation, implementation of DR results in a total 
of 376 MW shifted by 15-minute, 140 MW shifted by 30-
minute and 99 MW shifted by 45-minute which provides a 
savings of $2,986. For medium demand, the savings are about 
$1,100 and DR actions are lower compared to high demand 
scenario. For low demand scenario, the system is operating well 
below its capacity and as a result, both SCED and SCED-DR 
provides the same solution. Here, DR actions are not activated 
since none of the lines in the system are congested.  
 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = ∑ �𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡∗𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥�𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡
∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥 ∗ 100%   (27) 
 
Fig. 4. Total system cost and cumulative DR shifted for different scenarios. 
The implementation of DR also flattens load profile as shown 
in Fig. 5. This directly correlates as an increase in system short-
term load factor utilization (LF). In this paper, the short-term 
LF is defined as the ratio of the average load to the peak load 
during the entire time period. This is represented in (27). The 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 in SCED for medium and high demand scenario are 92.5% 
and 89% respectively. Whereas, in SCED-DR, the 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  for 
medium and high demand scenario is 96.8% and 96.4% 
respectively. For low demand scenario, the LF is unchanged in 
SCED and SCED-DR as there are no effective DR actions 
required in SCED-DR. As DR actions takes place, it leads to 
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higher load factors which indicates an increase of efficient 
utilization of system resources. 
 
Fig. 5. Net demand served for various intervals in SCED/SCED-DR. 
B. FSMI Cyber-Attack: 
The line loading rate is defined as the ratio of line power flow 
to line thermal rating; the pre-attack line loading rates of all 
lines for the high demand scenario are obtained from SCED-
DR and are represented in Fig. 6. The limited-channel FSMI 
attack model limits the attacker to focus on the channels that 
receive DR signals from operators. Therefore, to damage the 
system, the attacker should first select a targeted line to operate 
his attack. From Fig. 6 that shows the initial system condition, 
the plausible target lines are line 10, line 28 and line 23 which 
have the highest loading rates in the system. It can be noted that 
line 10 and line 28 have a loading rate less than 100%, which 
implies that these lines are uncongested in the pre-attack state; 
whereas, line 23 with a loading rate of 100% implies that the 
line is congested or carrying  a flow at its capacity. For line 10, 
the power flow during pre-attack is 139.6 MW while the 
thermal rating of line 10 is 157.5 MW. For line 28, the power 
flow before attack is 400.7 MW and its thermal rating is 450 
MW. For line 23, the power flow before attack is at its thermal 
rating limit, 315 MW.  
 
Fig. 6. Pre-attack line loading rate of all system lines. 
To study the effectiveness of the proposed limited-channel 
FSMI cyber-attack, we highlight results for three targeted 
instances: (i) line 10 as targeted line, (ii) line 28 as targeted line 
and (iii) line 23 as targeted line. Sensitivity analysis is 
conducted to examine how the parameter 𝛼𝛼  affects the 
performance of the proposed limited-channel FSMI attack. This 
is done by varying 𝛼𝛼 from 10% to 100% which directly changes 
the limit of DR deviation in the FSMI attack model. Fig. 7 
illustrates the line loading rate of those three lines under three 
attacks with target on line 10, 28 and 23 respectively. All three 
DR attacks result in an increase in actual target line power flow; 
the increase for the attack targeting on line 10 is the greatest. 
However, it is not overloaded even when the load shift 
deviation factor is set to 100%; this is because the loading rate 
of line 10 is low in the pre-attack state. For line 23, a congested 
line in the pre-attack state, can be easily and significantly 
overloaded. From the perspective of an attacker, an attack on a 
congested line would be very effective even with limited 
resources. 
 
Fig. 7. Loading rate of line 10, line 28 and line 23 for a limited-channel 
FSMI attack with the attack target of line 10, line 28 and line 23 respectively. 
 
Fig. 8. Loading rate of line 23 with a limited-channel FSMI attack and an 
unlimited-channel FSMI attack model with the attack target of line 23. 
Fig. 8 shows the changes of line 23 loading rates with various 
settings of the total amount of DR deviation 𝑄𝑄0 from 0 to 100 
MW, under a limited-channel FSMI attack and an unlimited-
channel FSMI attack respectively. The maximal power flow on 
targeted congested line 23 increases slightly and then remain 
stable with a maximum line overload of 3.3 MW for a limited-
channel FSMI attack; however, the flow overload on the same 
line exceeds 18.9 MW when an unlimited-channel FSMI attack 
model is utilized. In Fig. 8, 𝛼𝛼 is set 0.3. 
The impact of an unlimited-channel FSMI attack model on 
various demand scenarios was studied using the three demand 
scenarios: low, medium and high demand scenarios, where DR 
deviation 𝑄𝑄0 is set 100 MW. The SCED-DR solution for high 
demand and medium demand emphasizes that line 23 is always 
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congested, which implies it is more likely to be chosen as the 
targeted line. Fig. 9 illustrates the effect of the demand level in 
an unlimited-channel FSMI attack model on target branch 23. 
The simulation shows that loading rates always increase on the 
targeted line. Especially, under high demand and medium 
demand scenarios, the loading rate of targeted line increases 
considerably whereas the increase in targeted line loading rate 
is marginal for low demand scenario.  
 
Fig. 9. Change in line loading rate on targeted line 23 using an unlimited-
channel FSMI attack for different demand levels. 
VI.  CONCLUSIONS 
A SCED model incorporating demand shifting as DR action 
for real-time applications was presented. It can be noted that 
DR leads to substantial cost savings especially when the system 
is congested. DR also leads to significant flattening of load 
profile in the short term by shifting demands in peak periods to 
non-peak periods. SCED-DR under low demand resulted in 0 
MW of demand shifted whereas medium and high demand 
resulted with 246 MW and 643 MW of cumulative DR actions 
respectively, for the entire time period. This corresponds 
directly to a higher short-term load factor usage of 96.8% and 
96.4% in the case of medium and high demand scenarios, 
respectively. However, if these DR channels are hacked, the 
system can be vulnerable to targeted cyber-attacks that affect 
the system adversely. 
The proposed FSMI cyber-attack model can effectively 
manipulate the DR signals to maximize the power flow on a 
targeted line and thus overload the targeted line. Initially, the 
effectiveness of the limited-channel FSMI attack was analyzed 
by modelling the attack on various targeted lines along with 
their sensitivity to the key parameter 𝛼𝛼. Simulation results show 
that congested lines are more sensitive to the cyber-attack than 
non-congested lines and they can be overloaded with ease. 
Finally, the unlimited-channel FSMI attack was examined, and 
numerical simulations show that the unlimited-channel FSMI 
attack leads to much larger line overloads than the limited-
channel FSMI attack. It is noted that high demand scenario may 
cause more significant overload than other scenarios. 
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